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1THE EURO CRISIS: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
This paper sheds light on the current euro crisis by looking at the debates preceding the 
conception of the euro. How can the early days of EU monetary cooperation help us 
understand today’s predicament? And what lessons can we draw from them for the euro?1
Today’s debates about the viability of the eurozone bear a striking resemblance with 
those about the creation of a European single currency in the late twentieth century. The 
early steps of European monetary cooperation, the negotiations over the creation of the 
European Monetary System (EMS), those over the creation of the euro, as well as the other 
plans suggested which eventually failed (the proposal for a European parallel currency for 
instance), help us better understand the challenges that the euro faces today. Many of the 
issues at stake then are indeed still central to debates now. The question of the transfer 
of resources from richer to poorer member states, the adoption of a German-inspired 
interpretation of monetary policy, to take but two examples, are issues that anyone reading 
today’s newspapers will be familiar with. This paper argues that looking at these past 
debates do not just provide an insight into the past – but also helps us better understand 
our current predicament.
The dual source of European monetary unification
The eurozone is today criticised for some faults of conception. But what was the rationale 
behind the search for monetary stability – and the creation of a single currency – in 
Europe? Two major sources of European monetary unification can be identified: the need to 
consolidate the common market and the affirmation of Europe.
1   I wish to thank the organisers and participants of the Tsuda College Open Lecture Series in Tokyo, and of the Jean Monnet Lecture   
Series in Aarhus University (Denmark), where I presented some of my ideas earlier this year, as well as Liz Benning, Nick Kitchen and 
Angela Romano for their comments.
2The European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of today’s European Union (EU) 
was created in 1957.2 At its core was the establishment of a common market. The EEC 
focused on the establishment of four freedoms within it, namely the free movement of 
goods, capital, services and people. Monetary fluctuations were quite obviously potentially 
harmful, as they could provoke severe trade distortions among the different members of 
the zone. If, for instance, the currency of country A is revalued while that of a country 
B is devalued, the products of country A will comparatively become more expensive in 
country B, and the exporters of country A will fear losing markets in country B. Were such a 
monetary instability to last, the government of country A may well consider erecting trade 
barriers, so as to compensate for country B’s comparative advantage taken from its devalued 
currency. This would obviously run against the basic rationale of the common market, and 
simply threaten to put an end to it. And it must be remembered that at the time when 
monetary fluctuations considerably increased – in the late 1960s and early 1970s – the EEC’s 
internal customs union was still very young: it had only been achieved in 1967. Besides the 
customs union, the EEC of the 1960s had a flagship policy: the common agricultural policy 
(CAP).3 This system of agricultural protection and subsidy, entered into force in 1962, had 
one important feature: the establishment of common price levels for agricultural products. 
It is again easy to foresee how complex life would become with such a common price in the 
event of monetary fluctuations.
And here indeed was the key: all these early developments of European integration 
happened in a monetary cocoon, that of a stable Bretton Woods system. The common 
market and the CAP were not endangered by the theoretical risk of monetary fluctuations 
since it was yet still largely inexistent – or at the very least under control. Conversely this 
meant that once the international monetary system entered into crisis, the entire EEC system 
threatened to collapse. Hence, if increased monetary cooperation was perhaps desirable in 
itself, and if some dreamed of a future European single currency, the need to protect the 
achievements of the EEC – the common market and the CAP in particular – constituted 
the decisive trigger for action. On various occasions in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
ingenious plans were thus devised in order to improve European economic and monetary 
cooperation: the Barre memoranda in the 1960s; the Werner plan in the early 1970s calling 
for the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union in three stages, and contributing to 
the inception of the so-called ‘snake’ (a mechanism whereby currencies were allowed to 
fluctuate within limited margins), the European monetary system (EMS) from 1979 onwards; 
as well as various plans suggesting the inception of a parallel currency (the 1975 All Saints’ 
Day Manifesto of The Economist for instance).4 They all shared a similar concern: that of 
stabilising monetary relations in Europe, and thereby stabilising the EEC itself. But why 
did monetary cooperation, from the late 1970s onwards, manage to become one of the 
flagship endeavours of the EEC/EU, if not of European integration as such? The answer lies 
in the political impetus associated with European monetary integration.
2  Dinan, D. Europe Recast. A History of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
3  Knudsen, A-C. Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.
4  Ungerer, H. A concise history of European monetary integration, from EPU to EMU. Westport Conn.: Quorum Books, 1997.
3The second major source of European monetary unification in the second half of the 
twentieth century was the affirmation of the EEC on the international scene. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the decision to prioritise EMU partly came from the perceived need 
for a new bold step in European integration. The EEC heads of government, on the occasion 
of The Hague summit in December 1969, thus decided to set up the Werner Committee in 
order to discuss EMU plans further.5 Similarly, the creation of the EMS had a lot to do with 
the affirmation of Europe as an international actor. Confronted with perceived US economic 
and monetary mismanagement, the EEC decided to respond at the regional level. Facing the 
fall of the dollar, Helmut Schmidt, the then West German Chancellor, thus declared that it 
was “urgently necessary that the Europeans say to the Americans, that’s not going to carry 
on.”6 The West German Chancellor managed to convince his European partners that the 
creation of a European monetary bloc would contribute to improving monetary stability in 
spite of transatlantic tensions. Finally, all the debates linked to currencies in the EEC, from 
the obscure units of accounting used for CAP purposes to the ECU and the euro, were all 
strongly related to questions of European identity. A distinct organisation such as the EEC/
EU, it was often purported, needed to assert its identity by having its own currency.7
But the affirmation of Europe as an international actor was not only a voluntary move. Quite 
often, external crises spurred European (re-)action. As mentioned above, West German 
perception of US economic and monetary mismanagement in the late 1970s convinced 
Helmut Schmidt that a move at the European regional level was necessary, yet prior to this 
external trigger for action, the West German Chancellor was little interested in taking a 
step further in European monetary cooperation. Even earlier, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in the early 1970s both condemned the implementation of the Werner 
plan and rendered even more salient the need to stabilise monetary relations in Europe. A 
near-fixed exchange rate system such as the snake, the economic development of which 
members often differed greatly over, could not work amidst strong international monetary 
fluctuations; but these strong fluctuations further stressed the need to have a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe, so as to protect, among others, its trade and its agricultural 
policy. These two dimensions were well summarised by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then French 
Finance Minister, in January 1974: 
“If the international monetary system was itself based on fixed 
exchange rates and on currency convertibility the problem 
would have been much less acute. You know that there 
has been a historical co-incidence between the progressive 
5   Ibid.
6 Margaret Thatcher Archive, Bundesbank Council Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt, 30 November 1978, available at 
     http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/111554, accessed 8 June 2011.
7 Clavert, Frédéric. “Une identité monétaire européenne?”, in Marloes Beers and Jenny Raflik (eds), National Cultures and Common    
Identity. A Challenge for Europe? (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), pp.39-46.
4organisation of economic and monetary union in Europe and 
the progressive dislocation of the international monetary 
system.”8
European monetary unification had thus two clear incentives: the consolidation of the EEC 
and the affirmation of Europe as an international actor. But as in any plan for monetary 
union, the crux of the problem rests on the question of the economic convergence of its 
members. How did the EEC plan to cope with this?
Well before the creation of the euro, an important academic debate developed concerning 
monetary unions, that of the so-called Optimum Currency Areas (OCAs). The start of the 
OCA debate is usually associated with the publication of Robert Mundell’s eponymous 
article in the early 1960s.9 As its name suggests, the OCA debate is about determining 
in what areas would the use of a common currency be optimum. Put differently: in what 
group of countries would the use of a common currency produce no decline in well-being? 
Robert Mundell identified two factors helping to identify such an area: the mobility of 
the factors of production (labour and capital) and the symmetry of external shocks (i.e. 
the entire group of countries must receive identical shocks). Subsequently, other authors 
added new factors to this list. To name but a few, Ronald McKinnon stressed the openness 
of the economy, Peter Kenen the diversification of production, James Ingram the financial 
dimension, Gottfried Haberler and Marcus Fleming the convergence of inflation rates.10 
The extent to which Europe forms such an OCA, then and now, gave birth to endless and 
passionate debates. Whatever the conclusion one may draw while examining these criteria, 
the OCA debate highlights the profound implications of a full monetary union, in particular 
in fiscal and budgetary terms. And it is not certain that European policy-makers – then and 
now – while talking about the desirability of EMU or the future of the euro, had and have 
ever realised its full implications.
Convergence before the euro
It is clear, however, that from the very beginning the EEC represented an imperfect OCA. 
And in order to render the EEC/EU a more ‘optimal’ currency area, policy-makers have 
attempted to improve European cooperation in two different ways: technical and political.
8  Archive du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, DAEF, Box 971bis, “Les étapes et les difficultés de l’organisation monétaire de   
 l’Europe”, Speech of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 25 January 1974. My translation.
9  Mundell, R. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”. The American Economic Review, Vol.51, n°4, September 1961, pp.657-665.
10  McKinnon, R. “Optimal Currency Areas”. American Economic Review, Vol. 53, September, pp.717-724; Kenen, P. “The Theory   
 of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View“, in R. Mundell and A. Swoboda (eds), Monetary Problems of the International 
 Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Ingram, J. “Comment: The Optimum Currency Problem“, in R. Mundell and 
 A. Swoboda (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Haberler, G. 
 “The International Monetary System: Some Developments and Discussions“, in George N. Halm (ed), Approaches to Greater 
 Flexibility of Exchange Rates, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) and Fleming, M. “On Exchange Rate Unification“, 
 Economic Journal, Vol. 81, September 1971, pp. 467-488.
5Albeit not necessarily consciously, various mechanisms have been created in order to render 
the economic development of the EEC/EU more even – and thereby the use of a single 
currency more optimal. Structural policies represent a first direct attempt at balancing the 
development of European economies. The European Investment Bank, created in 1958, is 
the EU’s lending institution, financing projects mostly in economically weak EU countries by 
borrowing on the capital markets. The CAP in the 1960s or the regional fund in the 1970s 
are two examples of policies aimed at creating mechanisms for financial redistribution in 
the EEC/EU. The negotiations for the creation of the EMS, in the late 1970s, was an even 
more typical example of this.11 The EMS negotiations were indeed split into two legs: one 
strictly monetary – the design of the future exchange rate mechanism (ERM) – and one 
economic – the so-called ‘concurrent studies’. The latter were started at the insistence 
of those countries (chiefly Britain, Ireland and Italy) which were not sure of being able to 
maintain their currencies within the EMS because of their weaker economies, in comparison 
to others (chiefly Germany and the Netherlands). The ‘concurrent studies’ discussed the 
possibility of increasing the actual transfer of resources in the EEC from richer to poorer 
member states. Overall however, the concurrent studies produced no significant results. 
Crux was that the potential contributors – chiefly Germany – were not willing to pay. But 
the ‘concurrent studies’ did highlight the perennial tension between monetary unification 
and economic convergence. And they also underline that our current predicament was 
already a cause of concern and a source of inaction forty years ago. A second category is 
made of larger projects aimed at furthering economic development within the EEC. The 
single market project, initiated in the mid-1980s, was typical. The aim behind the removal of 
non-tariff barriers was to intensify the economic development of the EEC as such (through 
more intense competition), and over time render it more balanced across its members.12 
A third category concerns actual financial mechanisms aimed at supporting European 
monetary cooperation. These could be mere swap agreements between central banks, or 
the inception of new institutions (the European monetary cooperation fund – often known 
under its French acronym, FECOM – or the stillborn EMF (European monetary fund) that was 
supposed to have been created two years after the EMS’ inception).
These mechanisms – structural, competition, financial – were thus aimed at protecting and 
improving the development of the EEC, in an economic and technical sense. Politically and 
institutionally, the 1970s also witnessed the creation of a new institution which would play 
a considerable role in European integration, namely the European Council. In December 
1974, gathered in Paris, the EEC heads of government decided that from then on they 
would meet three to four times a year as the European Council.13 The idea was not only 
to give a new impetus to European integration, but also to create an institution where 
the economic and the political could meet. Up to that point the EEC was, to paraphrase 
Hayward, ‘leaderless’.14 The creation of the European Council sought to fill this leadership 
11   Mourlon-Druol, E. The Emergence of a European Bloc? The Origins and Creation of the European Monetary System. Ithaca: Cornell   
  University Press, forthcoming.
12   Ludlow, P. “From Deadlock to Dynamism. The European Community in the 1980s”, in Desmond Dinan (ed), Origins and Evolution  
  of  the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.218-232.
13   Mourlon-Druol, E. “Filling the EEC leadership vacuum? The Creation of the European Council in 1974”. Cold War History, 2010, 
  vol. 10, n°3, pp.315-339.
14   Hayward, J. Leaderless Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
6vacuum, and also to ensure overall consistency in the development of European integration. 
Importantly, the European Council provided, on significant occasions, the decisive political 
impulse to some European initiatives. Most famously, it played a central role in the EMS 
negotiations, and later in the creation of the euro.15 The emergence of the European 
Council had two important consequences. First, its political impetus managed to sustain 
the belief, now and then, that monetary integration was the only way to further European 
integration. Jacques Rueff, a French economist, once famously quipped that “Europe will be 
made through a common currency or will not be made.”16 Be it true or not, be it sensible or 
not, this belief is one of the central motivations of European monetary developments. Jean 
Lacouture, one of François Mitterrand’s biographers, thus summarised the French president’s 
choice to leave or stay in the EMS in 1983 as “socialism or Europe.”17 The equation was that 
the EMS is Europe. Another important consequence of this belief was to narrow down the 
options on the road to a monetarily integrated Europe. From the 1970s onwards, the central 
idea was that the only way to integrate Europe monetarily was through the narrowing of 
exchange rates. Yet, other options existed at the time – like that of creating a European 
parallel currency – but were not given the same attention. Until the creation of the euro 
therefore, the convergence of European economies was sought through various economic, 
financial, political and institutional means, but not fully achieved. 
Yet, in spite of these attempts, the EEC/EU remained an imperfect OCA. More problematic, 
the mechanisms devised in order to palliate these imperfections remained limited. Before 
the creation of the euro, there still existed no significant transfer of resources from richer 
to poorer EEC/EU member states: the EEC/EU budget was around 1%. The very modest 
increase in the size of the EEC budget recommended in the late 1970s by the MacDougall 
Report on the role of finance in European integration – “from 0.7% to around 2-2.5%” 
– was never followed.18 There existed, however, an old debate on this question: the so-
called economists versus monetarists wrangle. The ‘economists’ considered that economic 
convergence should happen before actual monetary integration. The ‘monetarists’ – not to 
be confused here with Milton Friedman’s monetarism – believed just the contrary: monetary 
integration would act as a trigger for economic convergence in the EEC/EU. Has this proved 
true?
Convergence since the euro
Or put it differently: is the eurozone today an OCA? Let’s come back to the various criteria 
outlined above. Financial integration, the mobility of capital and the convergence of 
inflation rates have been fully achieved. The first two have largely been put into practice 
following a strict implementation of the Treaties of Rome, while the last has been achieved 
in the past twenty years. To be sure, inflation rates are not identical across the EU. But 
15   Marsh, D. The Euro. The Politics of the New Global Currency. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
16   Rueff, J. “L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas”. Revue Synthèses, n°45, 1950.
17   Lacouture, J. Mitterrand. Une histoire de Français, vol. 2, Les vertiges du sommet. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998, p.59. 
18   Commission of the EEC, Report of the study group on the role of finance in European integration (so-called “MacDougall   
  Report”), April 1977.
7theses differences are minimal compared to those of the 1970s. In 1975 for instance, 
inflation was in average 11.75% in France, 24.11% in Britain, 17.24% in Italy and 5.91% 
in Germany. In 2010 it was 1.53% in France, 3.29% in Britain, 1.52% in Italy and 1.14% in 
Germany. We moved from a double-digit/one digit difference to a very trivial one.
Many other OCA criteria remain, however, unfulfilled. If the mobility of workers exists in 
theory, it is very low in comparison to other monetary unions, like in the US for instance. 
In 2005, 2.5% of working age population in the US moved between states, while the 
figure in the EU was about 0.1%.19 This can certainly be explained by many reasons, 
including culture, traditions, language and social protection, but it remains a drawback for 
a zone sharing a single currency. The EU’s budget is still extremely low, around 1% of the 
Union’s GDP (a figure which is again very low in comparison to the US federal budget, of 
about 20%). As a consequence, very little spending exists on redistribution/stabilisation 
mechanisms across the EU. True, as explained above, money is spent on the CAP, on the 
regional fund and on other various projects. But there is still no significant help for a region 
facing a sudden economic crisis. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is still no fiscal 
integration.
As a consequence, the achievements of European integration are still imperfectly secured. 
Of course, the CAP and the single market have now been safely protected by the inception 
of a single currency. But this single currency is itself still very imperfectly protected. The 
creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) on 9 May 2010 was a first concrete 
attempt. This new entity is aimed at preserving financial stability in the EU by providing 
financial assistance to eurozone members in difficulty. But it only works when a member 
cannot borrow on markets at acceptable rates, and its tenure is for three years (or the 
maturity of the financing instruments).20 And whilst the European Commission suggested 
(once more) a reinforcement of economic policy coordination in the EU a few days later, 
there is, however, still no prospect of an increase in the EU’s budget.21 Moreover, if the issue 
of fiscal integration is often raised, the recent Irish crisis has given a good example that a 
harmonisation was still unlikely. Even under strong pressure from its EU counterparts, the 
Irish government refused to raise its rate of corporation tax.
In parallel, the political dimension outlined above has evolved significantly since the early 
days of the European Council in the mid-1970s. The potential political leadership provided 
by the European Council is still there. Importantly, it has been reinforced by the Lisbon 
Treaty which created the post of President of the European Council, and contributed, in 
more general terms, to the overall strengthening of this institution. And crucially, the current 
euro crisis has shown that the single currency is still considered to be the cornerstone of 
European integration. In December 2011, during his traditional New Year’s address, Nicolas 
19  See European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, “Geographic Mobility in the European Union: 
 Optimising its economic and social benefits,” April 2008, pp.28-29.
20  See http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/key-figures/index.htm, accessed 8 June 2011.
21  Communication of the Commission, “Reinforcing economic policy coordination”, 12 May 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
  finance/articles/euro/documents/2010-05-12-com(2010)250_final.pdf, accessed 8 June 2011.
8Sarkozy thus solemnly declared: “The end of the euro would be the end of Europe.”22 
A similar idea was sustained by the highest political authority of the post-Lisbon EU. In 
November 2011, Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, declared that 
“we must all work together in order to survive with the eurozone, because if we do not 
survive with the eurozone, we will not survive with the European Union.”23
Yet this potential leading role of the European Council did not go without problems and 
inconsistencies. For a start, the existence of a President of the European Council does not 
seem to have significantly improved the situation. His role in the crisis remains obscure – if 
not simply secondary, the leading actors being the heads of government, and in particular 
the Franco-German tandem – and Herman Von Rompuy himself, is still next to unknown 
to the vast majority of the EU’s inhabitants. Most importantly, the inconsistency of public 
declarations at the end of European Councils have arguably proved devastating. Back in 
2010, during the European Council on 28-29 October 2010, EU heads of government 
discussed the possibility of restructuring the debt of a member state (against the wish 
of Jean-Claude Trichet, head of the European Central Bank).24 A panic in the markets 
logically ensued in the belief that a restructuring was imminent and resulting in the sale 
of mainly-Irish bonds. A mismanaged discussion of European monetary problems thus 
proved to be the cause for further monetary problems. True, this merely reflected legitimate 
disagreements, in particular between heads of government and the ECB. But it also 
underlined the perverse effect of a discussion in the European Council, which in that case 
had a multiplier effect.  A consequent, consistent and careful leading role of the European 
Council has still not yet been achieved.
22  See Voeux de M. le Président de la République, 31 December 2010, available at: http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/
 discours/2010/voeux-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique.10313.html?search=Europe&xtmc=la_fin_de_l_euro_serait_la_fin_de_l_ 
 europe&xcr=2, accessed 8 June 2010. My translation.
23  “Ireland crisis could cause EU collapse, warns president”, The Guardian, 16 November 2010.
24  Quatremer, J. “Restructuration des dettes publiques: les Européens calment la panique des marchés,” 12 November 2010, available 
 at: http://bruxelles.blogs.liberation.fr/coulisses/2010/11/restructuration-des-dettes-publiques-les-européens-calment-la-panique-des- 
 marchés.html, accessed 8 June 2011.
9Conclusions
The earlier debates in Europe about the creation of a single currency bear a striking 
resemblance with those we are witnessing today. Now as in the 1970s or even earlier, the 
crux of the problem rests on how to render economic and monetary policies consistent. 
This is also called “policy mix”: the mix of budgetary policy and monetary policy. The EU 
has so far focused on the other leg of EMU credibility, that is the independence of the 
central bank. As the OCA theory underlined however, economic policies – but also fiscal 
ones – should be consistent with the monetary system in operation. The debate had already 
appeared in the late 1970s, during the creation of the EMS, but failed in creating any 
significant mechanism. At that time many countries – including France and Italy – saw in 
the euro the creation of a tool capable of providing greater stability and reliability of their 
own domestic policy. It did work, but only to an extent, as their economic policies are not 
yet fully compatible with the supranational monetary one. Yet one should certainly not only 
look at the borderline cases – or the PIGS, as the Portugal-Ireland-Greece-Spain quatuor 
has infamously been dubbed – but also at the head of the class: Germany. Is the German 
economic model, export-led, really applicable to all other eurozone members? Is it desirable 
or even simply feasible? And in order to improve the consistency of EU monetary and 
economic policies, will any significant mechanisms for EU financial redistribution be at long 
last created?
Should all these difficulties lead one to conclude that the eurozone is doomed to fail? As 
Barry Eichengreen has argued, a breakup of the eurozone – or the event of one member 
leaving it – is unlikely.25 This is certainly not to say that the euro is perfect. Rather, it is 
trying to imagine what would happen were a country to leave the euro. And here the costs 
seem to clearly outweigh the benefits. Eichengreen identifies economic costs (capital flight, 
financial crisis, increased borrowing costs, inflation), political costs (second-class member 
of the EU, even perhaps membership of the EU called into question) and procedural 
costs (linked to the reintroduction of the national currency and the redenomination of 
all contracts: one must remember the long planning which preceded the introduction of 
the euro). Solving the eurozone’s problems will undoubtedly be long and complex. This 
brief survey of previous debates about monetary cooperation in Europe has somewhat 
pessimistically shown that lessons have rarely been learnt. We are still far away from the 
modest 2% EU budget advocated by the MacDougall report about 40 years ago. And even 
that alone would not be sufficient. Structural reforms in individual member states, perhaps 
the restructuring of its sovereign debt, the attempt to make an internal devaluation within 
the eurozone, or the reinforcement of the euro’s governance as Trichet has recently argued, 
are all potential options.26 Previous debates about monetary cooperation in Europe have not 
only shown the advantages of a single European currency, but also the political importance 
of the European idea attached to it.
25  Eichengreen, B. NBER Working Paper, the Breakup of the Euro Area, 2007.
26  Trichet, J-C. “Construire l’Europe, bâtir ses institutions”, Intervention à l’occasion de la remise du Prix Charlemagne 2011 à Aix-la-
 Chapelle, 2 June 2011, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110602.fr.html, accessed 8 June 2011.
10
It is not sustainable for countries with so diverse economies and structures to share a single 
currency. And since they now share it, and that it would be more costly to leave it than to 
remain in it, economic convergence is urgently needed. This means further harmonisation 
of fiscal policies, economic policies, and social policies. To be sure, this is a very difficult 
problem, capable of raising endless political disputes, and unlikely to be resolved painlessly 
overnight. And here lies probably the most perverse effect of the single currency: it has 
provided the illusion that the problem of inconsistent economic and monetary policies 
had disappeared. All of a sudden, we seem to have re-discovered it with the euro crisis, 
confirming that when it comes to understanding our current economic and monetary 
predicament, history should be used as much as economics.
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Glossary
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy
EEC  European Economic Community
ECB  European Central Bank
ECU  European Currency Unit
EIB  European Investment Bank
EFSF  European Financial Stability Facility 
EMF  European Monetary Fund
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
ERM  Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU  European Union
FECOM               Fonds européen de coopération monétaire 
                           (European Monetary Cooperation Fund)
OCA  Optimum Currency Area
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